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Geontographies: On Elizabeth Povinelli’s Geontologies: A Requiem for Late Liberalism 
 
Contributors  
Elizabeth R. Johnson, Garnet Kindervater, Zoe Todd, Keith Woodward, Kathryn Yusoff, 
with a response from Elizabeth A. Povinelli 
 
Abstract 
This forum brings together perspectives from geography, philosophy, and political 
science to reflect on Elizabeth Povinelli’s 2016 book, Geontologies: A Requiem for Late 
Liberalism. Contributions come from both junior and senior scholars across a range of 
interests and backgrounds. Elizabeth A. Povinelli's Geontologies is the fourth in her 
series on Dwelling in Late Liberalism that began in 1994 with Labor’s Lot: The Power, 
History and Culture of Aboriginal Action. In this latest text, she offers a retheorization of 
power and governance that challenges Foucauldian biopolitics. In its place, Povinelli 
maps a mode of power that she calls geontopower: a power that operates over the 
distinction between Life and Nonlife. Together with accounts of ethnographic encounters 
in Indigenous Australia, Povinelli’s text weaves together political theory, anthropology, 
philosophy, and cultural studies. With consequences for human geographers as well as 
thinkers concerned with the Anthropocene, climate change, and new materialism, 
Povinelli's work connects the experience of late liberalism and settler colonialism across 
space, place, and matter.  
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Openings  
Elizabeth R. Johnson  
Department of Geography 
Durham University 
 
Garnet Kindervater 
Department of Geography  
Dartmouth College 
 
Elizabeth A. Povinelli's Geontologies is the fourth in her series on Dwelling in Late 
Liberalism that began in 1994 with Labor’s Lot: The Power, History and Culture of 
Aboriginal Action (Chicago) and followed with The Empire of Love: Toward a Theory of 
Intimacy, Genealogy, and Carnality (2006, Duke) and Economies of Abandonment: 
Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism (2011, Duke). Like many 
anthropologists, Povinelli’s work is tied to ethnographic experience, wedded to a specific 
place. Much of her writing has taken shape around the Aboriginal Belyuen community of 
northern Australia. Geontologies sketches a map for its readers, not of space or place, 
however, but of the conceptual ontologies of settler late liberalism and the Anthropocene 
that bear on the “cramped spaces” in which her Belyuen friends live.  
 
In this, her most recent monograph, Povinelli offers a retheorization of power questioning 
the dominance of Foucauldian biopolitics as an analytic for late liberal governance. As 
she argues, the prolonged focus on the concept of life in critical scholarship has missed 
the ways that power presides over a more fundamental distinction between Life and 
Nonlife—not innocent terms, but categories of being (and therefore capitalized). 
Geontopower names a mode of late liberal governance that works on and through the 
dividing line between Life and Nonlife. It gets its power (quite literately) from 
categorizing Nonlife as such: as a something that can be said to be lifeless.  
 
Throughout the chapters, Povinelli shows how the separation of Nonlife from Life 
enables the extractive economies of settler liberalism. The boundary guides decisions 
over what forms geologic materials ought to take: If they are to remain in the Earth or 
circulate as technological components and whether they can be extracted without 
recourse to consequences (or sacrifice). This boundary also presides over which lives 
matter in late liberalism, governing difference among humans and between species. 
Mining companies and the state wield the definition of Nonlife over Povinelli’s friends 
who struggle to persist in the extractive and irradiated landscapes of the Northern 
Territories in Australia. She shows how the Belyuen’s rock and river ancestors pose 
challenges to the logics of geontopower and the prevailing politics of extraction. But the 
state also weaponizes these views as reason to treat Aboriginal communities as living 
fossils, hold-overs from a past to be respected only through the lens of memorialization.  
 
Just as biopower never fully eclipsed disciplinary or sovereign power, geontopower does 
not name a new regime of political power. Nor does it serve as a sequel to Foucault's 
analysis of late modernity. Povinelli develops a political analytic that describes how the 
distinction between Life and Nonlife is – and has always been – a predicate of all of these 
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forms of power. Sovereign power and late settler liberalism both require that Life be 
thought of in exceptional terms, as distinct from death as well as Nonlife. The ecological 
and social conditions of our contemporary moment make geontopower visible as never 
before, as climate change and the naming of the Anthropocene seem to be eroding the 
divide between Life and Nonlife. But, as Povinelli shows, the articulation of Life and 
Nonlife matters as much in the unraveling of that divide as it does in its maintenance.  
 
With reference to Foucault's analysis, Povinelli gives us three figures of geontopower all 
of which provide an account of the changing boundaries between Life and Nonlife: the 
Desert, the Animist, and the Virus. Like Foucault's four figures of biopower (the 
hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple, the perverse adult), 
these figures are diagnostics of the ways that late liberalism governs difference. As she 
writes, they serve as a “collection of governing ghosts who exist in between two worlds 
in late settler liberalism—the world in which […] Life (bios) and Nonlife (geos, 
meteoros) are sensible and dramatic and the world in which these enclosures are no 
longer, or have never been, relevant, sensible, or practical” (14).  
 
All three of these figures disturb. On one hand, they seem to harbor the potential for 
political transformations. The Desert is the end point of climate change and the nuclear 
apocalypse. We find it circulating within Naomi Klein and Elizabeth Kolbert’s writing on 
climate change where it is the limit of and catalyst for a transition away from late 
liberalism and disaster capitalism. Within this imaginary we find the sustenance of life as 
the primary motivation for social change, its operating principle indicative of a space that 
could continue to flourish if properly managed.  
 
The Animist casts all things as forms of life, as participatory actants in the dramas of 
(primarily human) socio-political events. In Chapter 2, “Can Rocks Die?” Povinelli 
considered the extraction of manganese from the sacred rock formation Two Women 
Sitting Down to take on the figure and role of the Animists, who infuses nonlife with all 
of the comforts and potentials of life. In finding vitality in Nonlife, the Animist promises 
to re-orient hierarchies of action and being. Critiquing Jane Bennett and Eugene 
Thacker's readings of Deleuze and Spinoza, however, Povinelli argues that the Animist 
imposes the qualities of life onto nonlife. Rather than bring heightened awareness to 
nonlife, the Animist excises nonlife from the world by simply enfolding it within life and 
eclipsing the conditions of Nonlife – inaction, inertness, finitude – with an all-
encompassing élan vital. Rather than decentering life or human-made forms of 
productivity, nonlife is brought into the orbit of [human] life and stripped of its capacity 
to remake us.  
 
The Virus names the wide-ranging and uncontrollable elements that threaten the social 
order – the terrorist, kudzu, or jellyfish (Johnson 2016). Between Life and Nonlife as well 
as Life and Death, the Virus seems to exist outside of geontopower. But in serving as the 
primary threat, the Virus mobilizes political power toward bio- and geosecurity.  
 
In some chapters, these figures appear central to the text. In others they seem to animate 
the analysis from the background. While their role in settler late liberalism is made clear 
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in the introduction, in later chapters their status as symptom and/or diagnostic is less 
apparent. Nevertheless, these figures help to mark the shifting boundary between Life and 
Nonlife, at times a hinge that enables the continued existence of settler late liberalism, at 
others an attempt to challenge those conditions. 
 
Throughout, Povinelli avoids the danger of paying lip service to decolonization while 
reducing difference to culture and conflict to a series of negotiations or contestations that 
can be resolved through dialogue (Vázquez-Arroyo 2018). Her work expands the 
language available to geography and the social sciences more broadly, particularly 
around calls to build toward decolonial research practices (see, for example, Jazeel 2017; 
Naylor, et al. 2017; Noxolo 2017; Radcliffe 2017; Asselin and Basile 2018).  
 
More than in her previous volumes, Povinelli's Geontologies sutures together philosophy, 
science, the law, and multiple stories and worldings from and of her friends in the 
Karrabing Indigenous Corporation and Film Collective. Together with ethnographic 
encounters in Indigenous Australia, Povinelli’s text weaves political theory, 
anthropology, philosophy, and cultural studies. Povinelli does not maintain distinction 
between disciplinary modes of knowing in ways that we are used to. It is therefore 
difficult to know how to characterize this text. Is it a work of philosophy? Anthropology? 
Cultural studies? The text conforms to none of these disciplines. Stories of everyday 
encounters speak back to Speculative Realism, Canguillhem, and Foucault, among so 
many others. The transitions among these registers can be dizzying, as Karrabing 
Collective films respond to questions posed by, for example, Malabou. One of the most 
pleasurable things about reading Povinelli’s work is how her life – so obviously not 
singular, but multiple – infuses her work as part of a collections of experiences and 
encounters that undeniably exceed life itself. 
 
The following reflections on Geontologies express the non-singularity of Povinelli’s 
work, tugging on different threads entangled in this most recent of her books. Cutting 
across human-environment geography, political geography, anthropology, and political 
theory, these interpretations pry at different fissures represented by Geontologies, 
opening several conversations across a variety of themes to which Povinelli responds. In 
“Reading Povinelli in the shadow of the Alberta Tar Sands,” Zoe Todd connects the book 
to the ongoing politics of extraction in Western Canada. Setting Povinelli’s geontopower 
alongside nehiyaw (Cree) legal principle of wahkohtowin (kinship, relatedness), Todd 
shows how indigenous principles of power, governance, and being yield alternative 
practices within the “cramped space” of late liberalism. From this vantage point, Todd 
mobilizes these cosmologies as situated ways of being that seek to refuse and transcend 
liberal colonialities (and how those colonialities manifest in white supremacy, capital, 
and patriarchy) as they seek to constrain Indigeneity itself. Elizabeth Johnson, in 
“Unsettled Ground,” illustrates the tactical ways that Povinelli’s geontologies unsettle 
seemingly unified visions of life and materiality that became signposts of late liberalism. 
Tracing the intricacies of an argument than neither injects vitality into the nonliving, nor 
leaves the nonliving as bare and inert, Johnson expresses the nuances of Povinelli’s 
geologic and temporal interventions. The epistemological concerns Johnson raises are 
addressed by Garnet Kindervater in “Life, Thought, Nonlife,” which explores the relation 
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between geontologies’ explicit ontological commitments, their epistemological 
requirements, and the political consequences produced by onto- and epistemological 
frictions. Kindervater focuses on the notion of “citational power” to express a 
fundamental tension between being and knowledge animating Povinelli’s theses, and 
which produce a particularly critical orientation to late liberalism itself. Kathryn Yusoff’s 
“You are not here” situates Povinelli’s writing among a burgeoning revolution in 
geopolitics that reimagines the earth beyond conventional bio- and international politics. 
Exploring the stakes of value surrounding world and life creation (ontogeny) and 
lithospheric deformation (orogeny), Yusoff explores the ways that political value is 
ascribed to categorizations – and more importantly, what such categorical ascriptions 
portend for projects of political change. In “Hovering,” Keith Woodward explores the 
distance – psychic, political, and physical – produced by the liberal monopoly over 
meaning in its latest phase. Woodward shows a kind of alienation produced for those 
whose lifeworlds are alien to the objectivity of the Life-Nonlife metaphysical distinction. 
In so doing, “Hovering” considers the range of ways that conventional metaphysics 
undergirding late liberalism create not only a cramped intellectual space for theory, but 
physically, materially marginalize those whose realities are articulated differently. In her 
response to the interventions, Povinelli meditates on reading and being read, taking up 
the opportunity to reflect on writings past and readers present.   
 
As much as these interpretations of Povinelli’s Geontologies explore central themes of 
the author’s work, they also expose the range of interpretations a text like Geontologies 
encourage. Povinelli’s work seems itself to invite this kind of engagement where we can 
contemplate collectively, thinking about the power and value of geontologies, as 
generative and multiple. Accordingly, the forum below might also operate as an artifact 
of readership and interpretation. Wherein a multifaceted text, compelling as it is 
sometimes slippery, generates not only different perspectives, but also a range of 
interventions. Each reading is a symptom of its respondent’s critical orientations, as well 
as the multivalence of the writing they hold in common. With consequences for human 
geographers as well as thinkers of the Anthropocene, climate change, political power, and 
new materialism, Povinelli's work connects the experience of late liberalism and settler 
colonialism across space, place, and matter. 
 
Reading Povinelli in the shadow of the Alberta Tar Sands: thinking wahkohtowin into 
disruptions of late liberalism 
Zoe Todd 
Department of Anthropology 
Carleton University 
I grew up in Alberta, a Canadian province that is metaphorically and literally drenched in 
oil. You may know the province today through one particularly virulent assemblage, the 
Alberta Tar Sands. The organizing force of our province’s colonial politics is most firmly 
the mechanics, logics, and yearnings of extraction. In other words, geontopower is 
vehemently at work in my home territory.  
In Geontologies, Povinelli shows us, through the notion of geontopower, that it is not 
enough to merely recognize non-Western or Indigenous ontologies. We must engage with 
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the consequences and implications of their erasure and capture (or, to reference Simpson 
(2014), apprehension) by euro-american/white supremacist/colonial actors. And, we must 
reckon with the foundational violence of the forced imposition of the Life/Nonlife binary 
upon myriad worlds, existences, assemblages, and peoples. 
The ‘cramped space’ that Povinelli (2016: 6) suggests that Indigenous interlocutors are 
forced to occupy in late liberalism is indeed constricted by the violences of white 
supremacy, capitalism, colonialism, and the brutality of western universalizing paradigms 
which seek to viciously erase non-western ontologies in the name of global capital. Back 
home, Indigenous legal traditions, cosmologies, and ontologies arguably operate as 
modes of Indigenous refusal (Simpson 2014; 2016). Reflecting on this, I am struck by 
how even the bluntest of epistemic weapons, including the Life/Nonlife binary and the 
geontopower at the heart of petrostate and extractive politics in Canada, has not 
succeeded in erasing the force and manifestations of Indigenous laws, stories, kinship, 
and knowledge here. This is indeed what Povinelli demonstrates in her work in Australia. 
Nehiyaw (Cree) philosopher Erica Violet Lee (2017) teaches us to refuse the cramped 
space relegated to Indigenous bodies, worlds, existences, assemblages, and ontologies in 
late liberalism. Lee insists on love and intimacy in the midst of the violence wrought by 
colonial forces, upending the colonial expectation that Indigenous longing and worlds can 
only ever be spectral:  
I cannot talk about death while your fingers taste like wild rice and your breath 
turns to sunlight in my belly. I cannot be disappearing if I insist upon a 
celebration in the midst of upheaval. I cannot be extinct if I refuse to let the lake 
settle. What do you want? I want to spend hours with your heat, talking about 
absolutely nothing of consequence. I want a moment to mourn the nutrients 
spilled, to accept this trauma as our kin, and then I want to move on. (Lee 2017) 
This, too, is what I wish. Lee’s words here are arguably a manifestation of the nehiyaw 
legal principle of wahkohtowin (alternate spelling: wahkootowin), a principle that Métis 
historian Brenda MacDougall (2010) defines as:   
a worldview that privileged relatedness to land, people (living, ancestral and those 
to come), the spirit world, and creatures inhabiting the space. In short, this 
worldview, wahkootowin, is predicated upon a specific Aboriginal notion and 
definition of family as a broadly conceived sense of relatedness of all beings, 
human and non-human, living and dead, physical and spiritual. 
While Indigenous bodies and worlds are forced to occupy vanishingly small space in late 
liberalism and are erased nearly wholly in universalist understandings of contemporary 
phenomena like the Anthropocene, this cramped space is nonetheless simultaneously a 
space occupied by myriad, plural and pulsating cosmos, ontologies, and worlds (which 
Povinelli ably demonstrates in the chapters of Geontologies). It is here that Indigenous 
praxis and philosophies – including principles like wahkohtowin – quite deliberately 
refract the forces of geontopower, bending and shifting them to yield alter-narratives and 
possibilities (or what Povinelli might refer to as the otherwise). Some astronomers and 
physicists argue that, after the Big Bang, the universe contained all of its materials in 
tightly bound worlds and cosmos expanding ever outward, unbothered by the momentary 
constriction of their circumstances (Library of Congress 2017). Similarly, it is important 
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to acknowledge the plural and simultaneous circumstances of Indigenous cosmologies, 
ontologies, worlds in this moment of late liberalism: constricted in the cramped space, 
yes, but also moving unapologetically through and beyond the violences of empire, white 
supremacy, capital, and patriarchy – literally expanding space itself in powerful forms of 
existence and manifestation.  
Kim Fortun (2014) argues that even if 'we have never been modern’, as Latour suggests, 
we nonetheless have a “modernist mess” on our hands as we contend with the toxicities 
and pollutants issued by late industrialism (Fortun 2014: 312). Similarly, in reading 
Povinelli’s work, I am struck by how, even if the Life/Nonlife dichotomy is the main 
ontological driver of late liberalism (which I think it is), we nonetheless also have a 
biopolitical mess on our hands, as Povinelli demonstrates. This requires our ability to 
work in many registers, and across pluralities, to tend to the violences of geontopower 
and biopower – whose offspring are the white supremacist, colonial, heteropatriarchal, 
capitalist nightmares wrought by european and american imperialism over the last half 
millennium. Povinelli’s intervention here is therefore an important one, in that her work 
forces us to contend with the biopolitical mess and the geontopower that drive the 
universalizing forces of global capitalist liberalism.  
This book, with its care and attention to Indigenous theory, must and will set the stage in 
euro-american academe to centre discourses that take seriously non-western theorists and 
their concerns, urgencies, and entanglements. It is a step towards even more robust 
provincialization of european thought, as Mbembe (2015: 13) urges us to embrace 
(drawing on the work of Fanon). Perhaps most importantly, this book forces the reader to 
query the epistemic violences of universalist/imperial knowledge, law, and governance. 
This is particularly necessary at a time when geontopower drives the contemporary 
discourses of the Anthropocene, geopolitical turmoil, climate change, space exploration 
and many other current crises, conflicts, and consternations. As Povinelli teaches us, it is 
not enough to acknowledge alternate ontologies, we must simultaneously dismantle the 
violent geontologies of late liberalism. Doing so will require a great deal of courage and 
care. 
 
On Unsettled Ground 
Elizabeth R. Johnson 
Department of Geography 
Durham University 
 
Povinelli's Geontologies unsettles. Rather than providing a grounding line upon which 
one might develop political agendas or alliances, Povinelli interrogates how the geo 
works as Wittgenstein’s “propositional hinge” (Povinelli 2016, 37). Each chapter in 
Povinelli's text offers another turn of the hinge, focusing on differences between settler 
and indigenous ways of distinguishing Life and Nonlife. With each turn, she shows how 
Life has been rendered an exceptional, dramatic character against a backdrop of a Nonlife 
to be manipulated only in the service of Life. The geontopower of late settler liberalism 
decides not only on how Nonlife is to be categorized, but how it is to be manipulated. 
Minerals of the earth are extracted, often made to re-manifest, as Povinelli notes, in the 
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form of technological objects. This creates the conditions for late liberalism to settle the 
world by uniting land and many lives in a damaged political and toxicological history.  
But Povinelli’s ontological gambit posits the geo—in the form of rocks, rivers, and 
fossils—as decidedly unsettled: neither human nor nonhuman, living nor dead. In doing 
so, she takes up and takes issue with the arguments of speculative realism, object-
oriented ontologies, and new materialisms all of which have attempted to offer new 
vocabularies of Nonlife. At the heart of Quentin Meillassoux’s speculative realism and 
Graham Harman’s object oriented ontologies, for example, Povinelli finds a categorical 
indifference. These philosophers have thought the earth as an object unto itself, one that 
exists as non-relational or, more precisely non-correlational. For them, material things 
express a world of objects that are not contingent upon the minds and bodies that 
apprehend them. In Nigel Clark’s words, they depict a world that is “to a large degree, 
indifferent to us” (2010: 50). In contrast, through Povinelli and the Karrabing Collective, 
we find an earth that is neither the Kantian product of human structures of thought nor the 
indifferent rock that operates through processes distinct from our own life-worlds. 
Instead, earthly elements are “intensely interested” in the movements and makings of 
collectivity. Here, different forms of existence respond to one another: Fossils and 
streams manifest themselves to human perception as the products of a “mutual orientation 
of existences” in place (59). This is a world of beings that can but at times chooses not to 
be indifferent to us. It is a ground that cannot be claimed or owned.   
Povinelli treads carefully here, ever aware of the trap of Lovelockian vitalism, in which 
all the world vibrates with lively activity. Povinelli’s figure of the Animist—found in the 
works of Jane Bennett (2010) and Eugene Thacker (2010), Latour's “Parliament of 
Things,” and at times in the fields of New Materialism, and Actor Network Theory—
names this tendency. The Animist excises Nonlife from the world by enfolding it within 
Life. Nonlife is therefore pinned to a productivist drive. This blinds us to incapacity, 
lassitude, and unbecomings. Rather than bring us closer to nonlife or death, the desire for 
“ceaseless becoming” expressed by the Animist “allow[s] us to escape what is worse than 
death and finitude, namely, absolute inertness” (55). By extending the attributes of Life to 
Nonlife, we anthropomorphize it, stripping it of its capacity to unsettle networks, politics, 
and things to which we have become habituated.  
That Povinelli’s writings on Nonlife also undermine the treadmill of progress—an 
ideology born in conjunction with settler colonialism—should come as no surprise. 
Through geontopower, the state enacts violence on those who would declare rocks and 
rivers as ancestors, rendering the survival of indigenous collectively a matter of 
preservation or a past mode of being, valued only in its memorialization. In contrast, 
Povinelli and the Karrabing film collective show us ways in which ancestral time is both 
“present and durative” (85). Against Ranciere's primary focus on language as the means 
by which we lay claim to a collective “we,” Povinelli proposes that Charles Pierce's 
“semiosis” turns our attention to the constitution of collective life through “coordination 
of the habits of being” (138). These habits become collectives that persist only so long as 
they continue to hang together. From here we begin to see the ways that human and 
nonhuman collectives—including those that dominate in our time of settler late 
liberalism—are constantly reproduced.  
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Through her turn to Pierce’s work, Povinelli suggests that the forms of Life and Nonlife 
that have taken hold, that have come to be seen as permanent lasting truths, have only 
ever been tendencies that we settle into. These are built neither on truth or knowledge, 
but on habit and repetition. Unsettling the patterns of late liberalism therefore also 
requires questioning the epistemic cultures that guide it and its potential futures. These 
include those modes of knowledge production that drive climate change research and the 
conditions of the Anthropocene. These typically view nonhuman life as subject to 
histories of human settlement. But what might an epistemology look like that takes 
seriously Life and Nonlife as responsive to (or, even, responsible for) our modes of 
engagement? Povinelli is clearly not angling for a view of the earth as Gaia; indeed, the 
earth and its processes as such are not issue in this text. Instead, Povinelli calls on us to 
account for the conditions of “an object's endurance, extension, and domination of 
interest” whether that object is a stretch of land or a planetary body (91). This requires 
attending to how the techniques of late liberal governance produce a “differential 
distribution” of our collective entanglements with the world. As those techniques are 
brought to light, the forms of Life and Nonlife forged in late settler liberalism begin to 
seem more fragile, far less durative, and far from “progressive.”   
In being unsettled, Povinelli's writing creates an opening for thought, making transparent 
a kind of vulnerable honesty. Her stories from the Northern Territories – some of 
encounters that took place now over thirty years ago – speak for the possibility of forging 
lasting attachments to place and people while simultaneously undermining the settled 
spaces and sedimented onto-epistemologies to which we have become habituated.  
 
Life, Thought, Nonlife: Ontology and Political Knowledge in Povinelli’s Critique of 
Liberalism 
Garnet Kindervater 
Department of Geography 
Dartmouth College 
In Geontologies (2016), Elizabeth Povinelli argues that biopolitics lost its (perhaps 
singular) dominance as the late liberal age corrupted distinctions within “ordering 
divisions of Life and Nonlife” (5). Biopolitics, Povinelli contends, depends upon an 
underlying form of power – one that for me is more an epistemology than ontology, but 
no less political. This proposed concept of power commanded a logically prior distinction 
between, not what lives and dies, but “the lively and the inert.” Or, clearer, another form 
of power struck between the living/dead and that which never had the chance. This 
subtending force is geontopower, a concept first traced by the book’s opening pages, and 
which expresses several critical, if perhaps fragmented, facets: 
1. In distinguishing it from biopolitics: “…a set of discourse, affects, and tactics 
used in late liberalism to maintain or shape the coming relationship of the 
distinction between Life and Nonlife” (4, my emphasis). 
2. In choosing geontopower over other plausible signatures: “…I want to intensify 
the contrasting components of nonlife (geos) and being (ontology) currently in 
play in the late liberal governance of difference and markets” (5, my emphasis). 
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3. Then, in a note to the first of these: “…the concepts of geontology (Nonlife being) 
and geontopower (the power of and over Nonlife beings) are meant to indicate the 
current phase of thought and practice that define late liberalism…” (179 n13, my 
emphasis). 
Hence, three features: A convergence of practical knowledge production; an intensified 
wedge between nonlife and being; a power of and over Nonlife beings – each an 
expression of “late liberalism.” 
It is easy to find oneself enamored by the implications of geontopower and its cognate 
concepts, not least because it enables a conceptual distance between Earth and political 
force in an age when quasi-apocalyptic debates hinge on the platitude that “the human” 
(anthrōpos) is destroying “the Earth” (geos). Geontologies does not do away with such 
distinctions but exposes such distinctions – a necessary addition to critique in the 
Anthropocene.  
Yet the allure of geontopower may well also do disservice to what geontopower 
ultimately articulates, which is neither the classical liberalism associated with secular-
capitalist-democratic modernity, nor about the ontological status of living/nonliving/dead 
things. Geontopower, like biopolitics, revolves around political efforts to define inclusion 
in political matters. Foucault in his earliest discussions of biopower, for example, 
questioned how a regime promoting life could be capable of killing. His answer: 
“Racism… [whose] first function… [is] to create caesuras within the biological 
continuum” (Foucault 2003: 255).1 Such caesuras serve not merely to legitimize political 
behavior, or to add quasi-scientific nuance to hatred. They also to superimpose upon 
ontologically exant things a kind of knowledge supposedly justifying the supremacy of 
some over others, and underwriting the attendant institutions delivering violence upon 
whom it defined as colonizeable, enslavable, those beyond salvation, the wretched, and 
the killable. Geontopower may use the same techniques to superimpose alterity upon 
those things outside of the scope of vitality or, at least, those that have been lifeless for 
impossible stretches of time. 
This is important and interesting in the context of Povinelli’s monograph for a few key 
reasons. The concept of geontopower might lack some concreteness in the text because of 
its (too?) many valences. But when taken as multiple expressions of a particular regime 
of late liberalism, geontopower’s varied senses illustrate the complexity not of an abstract 
modality of power, but of a regime of power in a particular periodization. Geontopower, 
after all, only becomes thinkable in an age where the foundation between Life and 
Nonlife ceases to satisfy and becomes apparent as their common ground begins to shake. 
I note the epistemological force of difference-making because even in “early” liberalism 
non-Christians, denizens of the antipodes, in other words, the “savage,” the 
unenlightened, the human fodder of the European colonial project – despite having life – 
did not have life of redeemable value to the metropole. This was a conceptual distinction 
animating a political project of centuries-long immiseration. Liberalism as difference-
maker relied on a revolution, not in what had inherent ontological value, but by what (and 
                                                
1 Rosi Braidotti (2007) shows a hinge between Foucault and Mbembe (2003). Alexander 
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whom) a modern quasi-science perceived of value across a its own intellectual scale of 
difference.  
Such accountings and their errors were matters of philosophical description and scientific 
testing (Wynter 2003). It was not a power distilled from ontological difference, but a 
power exercised through politics of vision and description. It was a power that in turn 
emboldened critique, which in turn said: We will reappropriate a word of hate; or, “[the 
colonizer] transform[s] himself into an animal” (Césaire 2000: 41); or, in Jeanette 
Winterson’s Weight, a retelling of the myth of Atlas: “My father was Poseidon. My 
mother was the Earth… My mother and father teemed with life. They were life” 
(Winterson 2005: 11). By the transformation of value, how presumably never-living 
things become revalued, or how some living things become devalued, each movement of 
Povinelli’s monograph expresses the nontrivial force of naming, of political semiology. 
As Povinelli puts it in her concluding chapter, “Late liberalism is a citational power that 
is able to figure a series of geographically and temporally diverse and dispersed 
occurrences into a part of this thing we call liberalism” (2016: 169, original emphasis). 
Cannot the “citational power” of Povinelli’s late liberalism, one that seizes on 
governance of markets and difference, find an affinity in Edward Said’s orientalism and 
its imaginary geography? After all, late liberalism, Povinelli argues, is “not anywhere or 
any thing” (ibid.). Its citational power is not mere naming, but the deeper power to 
organize thought, to render same and different – but not at the ontological level, at the 
level of knowledge; at the level, not of what matter exists, but what we think about what 
matters. Already in a long line of thinkers connecting epistemology to power and 
difference, Said called this a “radical realism,” where a vexing breadth of seemingly 
unrelated phenomena are unified by a word – in his case, the Orient – “which then is 
considered to either to have acquired, or more simply to be, reality” (Said 1994: 72, my 
emphasis).  
This radical realism is a ruse. It is a trick that creates knowledge as a means to organize a 
political vision of reality, then pivoting and calling it empirical reality – claiming its 
fabricated coherence as ontological truth. It is a sleight of hand in which Povinelli rightly 
detects the latent force carried within it to transform epistemological coherence into a 
claim to ontological reality. Or, to recall Said once more, “…we will appreciate how 
possible it is for many objects or places or times to be assigned roles and given meanings 
that acquire objective validity only after the assignments are made” (ibid: 54, original 
emphasis). 
All this seems interesting at the level of semiology, or of epistemological and ontological 
conceptualism, but where if at all are the political stakes? Writing about Thomas Hobbes, 
a figure rarely evoked in recent discussions of life and its value, the politics of affect, and 
the animist exercise of power apart from human life itself, Sheldon Wolin observed: 
“…Hobbes stated the basic task of political philosophy: to identify and define what was 
truly political. …[T]he function of theory was to help identify a specific type of authority 
and its province of activity. To identify and to define is to abstract certain characteristic 
roles and activities in order to subsume them under a classifying scheme” (Wolin 2004: 
259). This means that the first activity of a political philosophy is to outline in/exclusion. 
The first act of theory with political merit is to locate authority in the purview set forth by 
in/exclusion. Just as there is no lack of politics in the division cast by biopolitics between 
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life and death, there is no such apoliticality in the division between geontopower’s 
founding violence of Life-Nonlife. To manage their proprieties, their normative 
distinctions, their potencies and prowesses requires, not ontological framing, but 
epistemological naming. And outlining their various authorities and exercises of power 
grounds any reorientation; it sets not just their parameters, but also their politics.  
Povinelli knows this all too well. By the end of the book, late liberalism becomes an 
adjective for geontopower, which imbues geontopower with an air of an overarching 
principle capable of organizing a period in human and planetary history. She writes: 
And like late liberalism more generally, late liberal geontopower is a social 
project whose purpose is to keep an arrangement of accumulation in place through 
the specific governance of difference and markets that stretches across human and 
nonhuman forms of existence. Late liberal geontopower is an activity of fixing 
and co-substantiating phenomena, aggregating and assembling disparate elements 
into a common form and purpose. It is a set of dominant patterns, constantly 
tinkered with and revised according to local materials and conditions, according 
to which Life is fabricated and Nonlife is used (Povinelli 2016: 173-4). 
Call it object formation, or citational power, regardless, the extent to which late 
liberalism’s work of substantiating, aggregating, and uniting undertakes first and 
foremost to ally itself with a modern form of accumulation that always, and in the name 
of scientific exactitude, marginalized people as things, landscapes as enclosures, geos as 
mere use-value. Or, as Andreas Malm recently put it, “Only in a society that strives to 
turn every bit of nature into profit can the idea that nature has no independent existence 
take root” (Malm 2018: 217). 
In the end, Povinelli’s geonto(citational)power renames liberalism as a market-infused 
system of differentiation. Geonto(citational)power, reaffirms that liberalism strikes 
between peoples and their others. But also, now, and more clearly in focus, liberalism 
differentiates Life itself from Nonlife.  
Is this not the supreme act of knowledge? To locate, conceptualize, name, and in so doing 
to reorient reason to what it can never comprehend? I am too Spinozan in my 
commitments to believe a concluding remark, that “…Nonlife created what it is radically 
not [i.e., Life].” In reconceiving geos as such, this sort of political philosophy intervenes 
in and acts upon not only “life,” but also the very systems that subjugate what modern 
thought has excised from political value – whether human, merely living, or not. 
Povinelli’s concept of geontopower makes these namings, their values and their impacts 
more knowable, and therefore more possible as political subjects and objects. As the 
conceptual distance between human and planet supposedly widens, and at the exact same 
moment when their supposedly different forces collide to threaten the existence of not 
only all that lives, but that has ever been captured by thought, knowledge of geontopower 
perhaps bridges lengths formerly prohibited by liberalism in ways capable of restaging 
what we value, whether living or not. 
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“You are not Here”: Sessing2 the line between ontogeny and orogeny 
Kathryn Yusoff 
School of Geography 
Queen Mary University of London 
 
Between the biophysical idea of ontogeny (origination and genealogy, biological 
“family” of species life and its development) and the geophysical concept of orogeny 
(the geologic deformation of the Earth's lithosphere) questions emerge about genealogical 
description, as a biological mode and analytic, which stories earth. What and who are 
kin? Why do biological existents get kin recognition (albeit only some) and lithic 
existents get to be already classified as property? And how is kinship a sphere in which 
matter categories and modes of attention about what can exist and what can be 
extinguished get established? How does a biocentric focus get coupled with the ideal of 
the white settler family within settler colonialist governance to produce the Life/Nonlife 
division of matter as a regime of governance; a governance that enacts possession and 
dispossession? This is the timely question Elizabeth Povinelli asks. If the carbon 
imaginary is the basis of biocentric life (and by extension, an ethics of governance in its 
myriad of moral, administrative and juridical forms), what possibility is there for 
indigenous communities of having a rock in the family? How to withstand the 
genealogical exclusions of settler colonial geo-logics that don’t recognise the earth as 
kin? 
Povinelli’s Geontologies sits at a crossroads of critical engagement with indigenous 
politics of earth and matter and the various Anthropocene pluralisms that are busily 
rewriting worlds. The Anthropocene offers an engagement, albeit contradictory, with the 
notion of inhuman forces as a subjective mode of life (and death), thereby reshaping the 
narrative of the Life/Nonlife dynamic in specific ways. Nonlife is suddenly recognized in 
the Anthropocene as a life force and life itself is threatened by the acquisition of this 
inhuman force (i.e., ‘geologic life’ can be a toxic asset). The appearance of the 
Anthropocene as a concept at this moment of political ecological excess denotes a quiver 
of late liberal apprehension about the continuance of its life and its givenness as birthright 
and genealogical asset. This anxiety around liberalism’s reproductive capacities (or white 
settler futurism) are generating a set of questions around the ontological basis of western 
life in its current formation. Elsewhere the conditions of racial capitialism have been 
securing shitty conditions for marginalized communities for much longer and with much 
less attention than the current Anthropocenic meme. It is perhaps no wonder that we see a 
certain ontological promiscuity within these new earth discourses, drawing on 
                                                
2 Sessing is a reference to N. K. Jemisin’s exploration of race and geology (and much more) 
in The Broken Earth trilogy. The central characters in these novels are Orogenes who can 
understand the world by both seeing and sessing it. That is, Orogene’s know the pull of the 
earth and its cosmic kin, and through this geologic subjectivity they can buffer and extend the 
forces of the earth. Despite and because of their immense geophysical gifts, Orogenes are 
officially classified as non-human and suffer under the enclosure and constraint of a fearful 
and subjugating order. “To sess” is to travel in the mineralogical flows of the earth.  
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Indigenous, Black and “other” discourses (feminist, queer, nonhuman) that disrupt the 
narrative of Modernity and its end to offer a way out of a blocked future, which is 
looking decidedly precarious in its ability to reproduce the juridical canon of humanism, 
whiteness and reason (and its “revised” forms of poshumanism and the environmental 
humanities). I think of this desire as the desire for ontological deliverance: If we just rejig 
the ontology then it doesn’t have to be the end of the world, well the end of this late 
liberal version of it, anyhow. Yet, ontological deliverance will not save you.  
No matter how the child of the future is refashioned into the avatar of a mixed-race girl 
that will lead civilization out from the ruins to a different future (normally into the 
promised land of Canada) in any number of cli-fi films and novels, the futurism is the 
same. It is important that she is mixed race because she is a reproductive figure of 
incorporation and assimilation, a post racial figure for the end of the world that side-steps 
the deep colonial histories of ending worlds since 1492. That post racial Anthropocenic 
futurism takes up whiteness as genealogical category of power and redeems it rather than 
annihilating it (as long the colonial violence of forced removal of mixed-race children is 
forgotten), “we” can see new forms of genealogy being brokered. It is here that there 
should perhaps be caution in the alliances that are made in the ascending time of Geos. 
While the geohumanities engages with rock aesthetics that are often impervious to the 
grammars of extraction that mobilized the inhuman as a commodity and subjective form, 
Povinelli’s accounts of existents in hard-scrabble places are enduring to give regard to the 
possibilities of the otherwise of such relations and forge their languages of existence 
under ongoing settler colonialism violence. Anthropocene discourses certainly bare all 
the traits that Povinelli describes as the “speculative games of those who do not feel or 
are unaffected by the intensely interested nature of geontopower in late liberalism” (85). 
Into this trauma of Nonlife comes Povinelli’s timely analytic of geontopower (the power 
of and over Nonlife beings), grappling its way across the scarred skeins that are inscribed 
by this form of governance and its quagmire of its biopolitical allegiances (to biocentric 
white European norms). It is important that this work is situated in a deep commitment to 
working with a Karrabing analytics; analytics that occupy the narrow margins and violent 
eruptions of late liberal settler governance, as it “foregrounds the distributed nature of 
enfleshment” (174). Geonotologies sears into this “prisonhouse of biontology” to disrupt 
the inside/outside renderings of Life/Nonlife through the sored tissue of redress, attention 
and desire. That is, Povinelli pays attention to the affects that are marshaled at the 
Life/Nonlife border and which become its form of implementation. These are affects that 
often occupy the less dramatic forms of living and dying that the vitalist paradigm 
provides in its life/death caesura. Following her previous work on quasi-events, she 
convincingly demonstrates how the fixation with the event gathers a set of priorities that 
make life seem as the inevitable organizer of possibility/existence, when it is the “event” 
that does that work to establish life as a tautological horizon of its own accomplishment. 
In this sense, all vitalism is transcendental. It is the tense of the event, rendered as a set of 
strategies, affects and divisions of materiality, which creates a deformation in the 
possibility of other demands. Povinelli’s concentration on the “activity of endurance” 
(28) through a detailed traversal of Karrabing analytics offers a different praxis, whereby 
theory emerges through its own activation in the telling, in the redress, in the regard, and 
in the apprehension of reciprocity that is demanded from so-called nonlife. In Karrabing 
analytics, embodied obligation is not a work of finitude or completion in the event, “but 
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rather ongoing efforts of attention to often-nuanced interactions between human actions 
and other modes of actions” (79) where “truth was not a set of abstract propositions but a 
manner of attentiveness and proper behavior to the manifestations of a field of 
intervolved materials” (79). In this zone of attention, nonlife emerges as a political order 
in the body of a creek and an intimacy and investment in its endurance. Rocks as kin. 
While the ever-shakier foundations of the “good life” reveal themselves to be undermined 
and overburdened from within and without, settler colonialism’s golden spike of “Life” 
has long impaled “others” through a more discrete but no less deadly eugenics aimed at 
severing the interrelation between people and earth and consolidating its norms of 
property and possession at that site. The foil of the Life/Nonlife, inside/outside, 
lively/stone-dead game of governance is but a lure in the constitution of the settler state 
that attends to, what the Caribbean theorist Sylvia Wynter called the “selection” and 
“disselection” of different people from geography (Wynter 2003; see also McKittrick 
2014). The indigenous analytics that Povinelli’s work is organized from makes apparent 
how the regime of geontopower (and its operative geo-logics) has a much longer duration 
than that to which the recent spasm of liberal anxiety around the Anthropocene attests. 
While the Life/Nonlife binary is the last of the big binaries to get due attention (albeit in 
the form of a geological epoch), it is certainly one of the most persistent, supposedly self-
evident naturalized rubrics, Povinelli argues. It has maintained its hold on the imaginary, 
from critical theory to mineral extraction, to disimagining that rocks listen (see Povinelli 
1995). While the sciences might be giving us mineral evolution and deep life, it seems 
the attachment to the wonder of life (and its narcissistic forms in the white settler family) 
continually negate these mineralogical fields of emergence and attachments beyond 
tightly governed genealogies.  
Here, it might be asked whether what is imagined as sovereign is perhaps not the division 
of Life/Nonlife as the fundamental ground of governance, but rather its detour through 
the grammars of geology that cast those that are “disselected” from geography in an 
intimacy with nonlife through what Denise Ferreira da Silva calls a logic of exclusion that 
works through constitutive inclusion (Silva 2011: 146). That is, the Indigene is a figure of 
exclusion from a certain politics of life that becomes included through a figuration of 
inclusion on the side of nonlife (as ‘Stone Age race’, ‘breathing fossils in the way of 
progress’, practitioners of divergent subject/object relations in the judiciary, arche-fossil 
of land claims, deadly viruses in sex panics, non-biologically legible, reciprocate with 
stones etc. in Povinelli’s text).  Thinking with the logics of this settler liberalism that 
Povinelli names geontopower, she gives us three figures of the operative thought; the 
Desert, Animist and Virus that move through the text, like ghosts reassembling 
themselves in different guises at the feast. These figures express the deformation of the 
Life/Nonlife dynamic. What is on the table for the carnivorous colonial consumption is 
the extinguishment of an “interested” world in which the “on-going efforts of attention” 
to existents in all their manifold configurations and “secretions” are rendered inarticulate. 
Such attention and on-going obligation to local existents in the present of settler 
colonialism requires an analytic of ‘mutual belonging’ and ‘entangled substances’ (77) as 
a grammar secured against its erasure.  
Here, the hinge of the Life/Nonlife governance becomes exposed in its subtle erasure as a 
material and temporal placing that is enacted through the dynamic of Australian settler 
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law that continues to refuse the presence of such obligations, thereby curtailing their 
political present. Povinelli argues that the work is not to arbiter between these claims to 
truth but to attend to ‘whose arguments about truth and persuasion… gain the power to 
set the norm’ (91). All existents matter, but some divisions in matter get to enact the 
geopolitical cuts that extinguish other existents. In this wound of Geos that skins human 
and nonhuman life, genealogy is the hidden ghost in the machine of Life/Nonlife 
governance, of acceptable and illegitimate kin. Geonotologies provides a critical project 
of re-description in the presence of lithic kin, in which the “citational” power of 
Karrabing analytics is both an aesthetics of existent figures within a different set of 
geopolitical allegiances and a “linguistic category” (157) that keeps other arrangements 
in place. Sessing the line between ontogeny and orogeny, Povinelli’s Geontopower names 
a lived, ‘cruddy’ margin, an operative mode of governance and an analytical praxis for 
making it otherwise, for living with rocks in the family.  
 
Hovering 
Keith Woodward 
Department of Geography 
University of Wisconsin – Madison 
 
“…demandez au vent, à la vague, à l’étoile, à l’oiseau, à l’horloge, à tout ce qui 
fuit, à tout ce qui gémit, à tout ce qui roule, à tout ce qui chante, à tout ce qui 
parle…”   
—Baudelaire 
The closing lines of Geontologies: A Requiem to Late Liberalism’s penultimate chapter 
find Elizabeth Povinelli and several “colleagues” – members of Karrabing, an Aboriginal 
media collective – hovering in a helicopter “over a vast mangrove and reef complex” 
(2016, 144; 166-67) located somewhere along the coast southwest of the Daly River in 
Australia’s Northern Territory. They have travelled here from Belyuen Community to the 
north to participate in “a land survey for potential mining exploration in [the] area” (145), 
but theirs is more of a sojourn than a journey, more a suspension than a passage. We do 
not witness their voyage, but rather discover them already in the air, floating above the 
coastline, frozen in mid-flight. Nor will the volume’s “Conclusion” bring closure to this 
scene. It will offer no end to their hovering, no escape from the enveloping copter cabin, 
no eventual descent to familiar ground. Instead, the claustrophobic helicopter scene 
recalls to the reader the many “cramped space[s] in which [Povinelli’s] Indigenous 
colleagues are forced to maneuver as they attempt to keep relevant their critical analytics 
and practices of existence” (6). Captured within a pervasive Western settler colonialism, 
the group remains subject to a physical enclosure beyond which awaits perilous void; 
they are held at a remove from an area that they recognize as traditionally indigenous 
space; their ways of accessing such spaces are often mediated by settler colonial interests 
in property, extraction, and production; their peculiar view-from-nowhere is enabled only 
by the entanglement of capital and late liberal governance of space; their own position 
allows them not to determine if the space will be mined, but only advise where the 
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mining might take place; and even this is possible only if they perform a position-ality 
that settler colonial law imagines for them.  
The scene traces the narrow psychic, political, and physical space that prefigures 
existence in settler colonial late liberalism. What constitutes and encircles this 
claustrophobic zone, Povinelli argues, is Western ideology’s management of the division 
between Life and Nonlife – a metaphysical distinction so pervasive that it governs 
difference in everything from the physical sciences (the “Carbon Imaginary” structuring 
physics-chemistry-biology) to philosophical modes of existence (including the supposed 
irrationalism of “Animism”). Further, the very same divide currently structures 
discourses surrounding the “new drama” of total extinction through planetary climate 
disaster (8). This focus signals a change in Povinelli’s critical approach, which has long 
targeted more epistemologically-oriented forms of biopower. Beneath these concerns 
hides an ontological grounding that she calls “geontopower”:  
a set of discourse, affects, and tactics used in late liberalism to maintain or shape 
the coming relationship of the distinction between Life and Nonlife … Thus, 
geontology is intended to highlight, on the one hand, the biontological enclosure 
of existence (to characterize all existents as endowed with the quality of Life). 
And, on the other hand, it is intended to highlight the difficulty of finding a 
critical language to account for the moment in which a form of power long self-
evident in certain regimes of settler late liberalism is becoming visible globally. 
(4-5) 
Though her theoretical canvas has broadened, Povinelli continues to work from within 
the critical epistemological tradition. Geontologies offers no “new ontology” to add to 
critical theory’s ever-growing pile. Nor does it suggest corrections to extant theoretical 
schemas of Life and Nonlife. If she fixes her gaze upon metaphysics, she does so to clear 
a space for speaking critically about the politics of ontology and, in particular, the 
oppression that accompanies thinking existences that are illegible to Western logics. 
Settler colonialism includes, in other words, the colonization of metaphysics. 
Povinelli’s cast of colleagues includes several modes of existence that are recognized by 
Indigenous communities and collectives, such as Karrabing, that do not map cleanly onto 
those settler colonial imaginaries – rock formations, streams, winds, “Dreaming[s] or 
totemic formations” (26), each singular and possessing its own name: “Two Women 
Sitting Down, Old Man Rock, durlgmö, Tjipel, tjelbak, and thimbilirr: a multitude of 
geological and meterological modes of existence [that] have prompted people to demand 
an ethical and political reconsideration of who and what should have a voice in local, 
national, and planetary governance” (123). If such beings demand that we turn toward 
and learn to attend to their existences, then Povinelli’s abiding point is that, subject to late 
liberal logics, they get reduced to categories of “Animism.” Consequently, members of 
Indigenous communities subject to settler colonial governance are forced to “pass” with 
respect to Western metaphysics: “Indeed, the law demanded that Indigenous claimants 
bracket the entanglements of existence that transformed colonial dislocation into 
Indigenous belonging. They were told to tell the law only about the arrangements of 
existence that existed before colonial dislocation” (Povinelli 2016, 80). Thus, the 
coordinates of geontopower’s “cramped space” of existence closely resemble the 
doubling effect found in Gillian Rose’s (1993) “paradoxical space” of experience. But it 
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is also in the midst of being legally, discursively, materially, socially, and spatially 
squeezed by multiple settler colonial infra/structures, subject to a world that Western 
colonial governance imagines for them and that serves as an onto-ideological condition, 
that the members of Karrabing construct an improvisational, experimental politics. 
If thought and experimentation in a cramped space are a key concern of Povinelli’s 
project, nowhere is this clearer than in her reflections on Dreamings. Here, the book 
recalls her earliest inquiries into object intentionality (Povinelli 1995): Late liberalism 
simply cannot believe, as do Povinelli’s colleagues, that the Belyuen Dreamings mobilize 
some form of agency. Responding to this myopia, Geontologies introduces such 
existences – Tjipel, tjelbak, thimbilirr… – to initiate a series of thought experiments as its 
own mode of improvisational politics, asking: If we had eyes to see or ears to hear (2016, 
96), how might we think nonhuman existence beyond the proprietary object relations of 
settler colonialism? Occasionally, this even means reversing the inquiry: How might such 
existences react to the work of theorists like Quentin Meillassoux or Georges Canguilhem 
(96)? I am fascinated by such questions, not least because Povinelli’s answer, involving 
what she calls “materializing attention” (60), resonates with what I have elsewhere called 
“matter-processing” (as opposed to “subject-thinking”: Woodward et al 2013). However, 
I am struck by one key difference in our critical terms: Povinelli’s decision to retain the 
language of attention and sensation when speculating about the experience, 
understanding, and agency (in the broadest senses of the terms) of nonhuman objects, it 
seems to me, risks reproducing the coordinates of a dogmatic and humanistic image of 
thought. A prior decision seems to have been made that lays out thought and sensation, 
idea and the world, as axes composing a grid of Truth. That is, a constant test underlying 
Geontologies’s thought experiments concerns a differential between what may hold true 
for the settler colonialist vs., say, the object. Some resolution to this appears where 
Povinelli speaks through the voice of Charles Peirce: “Thought does something; it 
assembles and correlates; it does not represent something” (137, my italics). Certainly, 
assembly and correlation are key elements of the mutual attention that matter mobilizes. 
And yet, where she attempts to animate this process in her thought experiments, Povinelli 
seems to repeatedly fall back upon the language of representation by imagining the 
possibility for differential correlations across various existences. This is not to suggest 
that they would not be differential, but only that Povinelli’s argument (as well as 
Meillassoux’s!) would seem to demand that our imaginings reach an escape velocity from 
the cramped space of Western late liberalism’s image of thought as a truth-oriented 
system of correlation.  
This is perhaps the other notion that the helicopter scene suggests to the reader: That acts 
of surveying and reading the world unfold within their own cramped spaces of looking. 
All the more important, then, that memory enters the scene to shift our passengers to past 
visits to the coastal rock weirs below. Of course, this does little to prevent settler colonial 
governance and capital from spiraling the world, if not toward death, then at least toward 
a planetary “fecoventilatory collision” (Pynchon 1989, 280). As Povinelli puts it, “The 
earth is not dying. But the earth may be turning away from certain forms of existence” 
(28). Neither, in the meantime, does the recollection suspend the helicopter’s whirling 
rotors, nor still the vertiginous anxiety that fills the cramped, paradoxical space of its 
cabin, hovering while the earth turns below. But perhaps in the narrative’s memorial 
rupture, its momentary break with the manifestation of the present, Povinelli glimpses a 
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pure time – or a speculative geography – that flies above the late liberal limits of 
attention. 
Hovering hovering hovering… 
 
Response 
Elizabeth Povinelli 
Department of Anthropology 
Columbia University 
 
Easier advice to give than take. I always say that if people read you in a way that seems 
alien to your intentions, you should first think about how you are contributing to this 
misreading. So rather than spend the next few pages detailing what these wonderful 
responses got right or wrong about Geontologies, I thought I would first say what the 
book intended to do – or, what some three odd years after writing it, I now think it 
intended to do – and then speak to the issues raised by the incredibly generous and smart 
engagements with this piece of my work. And I mean what I write here. Each of these 
authors engage Geontologies through their own obsessions and commitments. And this is 
a good thing insofar as we can hear a rich range of responses from these exact people, 
whose work has been so essential, no matter whether they agree with this or that point I 
make, to our attempt to undo the uneven and differential terrains of late liberalism. 
It is hard to recount the intentions behind an older text when one's thoughts are already 
deeply within a subsequent set of concerns following from or adjacent to it. The trouble 
of retrospective interpretation that we all share is compounded by those of us who 
understand each of their books as a building on, or turning back into, the previous ones. 
So, for instance, I find it hard not to reinterpret my discussion of “Can Rocks Listen” in 
my first book, Labor's Lot or my discussion of the “Poetics of Ghosts” in my second 
book, The Cunning of Recognition, from my discussion of the governance of geontology; 
or geontopower. And now it is hard re-presenting my intentions behind the writing 
of Geontologies as I am deep within a reflection on what I have been calling the four 
axioms of existence in progressive critical theory. With these caveats in hand let me 
provide what I think are the three general purposes of Geontologies.   
First, I wanted to detail a mode of governance that has been operating in the open in 
Indigenous worlds since settler colonialism arrived in Australia. This mode of 
governance is the ontological and epistemological division between Life and Nonlife. As 
I say in the book, the division between Life and Nonlife that interests geontopower is not 
between Life and Death, but between things that are seen as having the potential to be 
born and die and those that do not. Note I use the copular “is”, i.e., “geontopower is the 
ontological and epistemological division...” That is, geontopower is not merely how it 
deploys this division but is the division itself. How this division has been deployed in 
Australian settler colonialism has depended on how settler governance has had to 
maneuver to maintain its legitimacy. Before the advent of late liberalism, governing 
others by differentiating their level of civilization and society via their understanding of a 
hierarchy of agencies and intending being. In late liberalism, this hierarchy is hidden 
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behind late liberal recognition – late liberal states claim to embrace the 
different spiritual beliefs (aka cultures) of those who see rocks as capable of sensing 
without this acceptance of cultural difference disrupting the ontological or 
epistemological centers of western philosophy and science. Thus I would slightly amend 
Kindervater's account of geontopower – geontopower becomes self-evident outside 
Indigenous worlds as late liberalism, itself a particular periodization, enters a crisis period 
around climate change and other forms of toxicity.  
Three subpoints follow. (a) Because I do not intend Geontologies (geontopower) to 
propose a new ontology and counter-ontology, Elizabeth Johnson's formulation 
“Povinell's ontological gambit” sounds funny to me even as I nod my head to her 
characterization of geontopower as a kind wedge to unhinge a certain apparatus of 
knowledge-power. But I have to cop to why my continued refusal (“I am not proposing a 
new ontology”) does and doesn't register as sensible. I think it is because, although I say 
that from where I stand alongside my Karrabing colleagues, geontologies is not an 
ontology but a mode of governance, this statement would seem to imply an alternative or 
counter ontology. That's not their ontology, elicits what is their ontology? So why don't I 
just say what is? Or admit that they have one? I thought my reasoning was more or less 
persuasively presented in the manuscript. But it might help to condense this reasoning: I 
am arguing that because ontology as such founds the very governance I am trying to 
elaborate, to pluralize and disperse ontology insinuates the elemental forms of this 
governance into other social spaces. 
Another way of putting this is to ask, Why must everyone have an ontology to show their 
equality within the order of humanity? I use the phrase “Karrabing analytics” as a way of 
marking the refusal to either have a version of what the west has or to be barred from 
humanity meaning and relevance. I also use the phrase “Karrabing analytics” to mark a 
possible alliance with other analytics, such as those Todd outlines among First Nations, 
without participating in the flattening of Indigenous and First People's worlds. If pressed, 
I would admit that my first assumption about existence is that it is entangled in such a 
way that different regions of this entanglement have more or less powers to affect their 
own condition of entanglement. But I would also say this “first assumption” is not in fact 
my first or last concern. My first and last concern is the operation of governance that, as 
Kindervater notes, is the extraction of value from Indigenous worlds so that they can be 
accumulated by others. I like to think that this is about the choice of what one is obligated 
to rather than an argument one wishes to avoid. I can understand if some disagree with 
my explanation for why I am not engaged with the problem of ontology.  
(b) As I noted, my way of understanding geontopower is not as something that emerged 
with late liberalism or emerged in the wake of biopower. My argument is that 
geontopower is shifting from background to foreground in the west as it is forced to 
acknowledge that what they were once able to place in their deep presuppositional 
background, they can no longer.  
And finally (c) I am not trying to hover above any world or any order of governance, 
hover hover hover, but rather stand alongside others in a particular place to knock down 
the drones apprehending them. Rather than above or under, alongside. I wish to steer the 
eyes of the critical north toward our own emeshment in this governance, and to 
participate in a conversation about how geontopower is as citational as liberalism. 
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Because settler colonialism has certain strategies in common even as it has elaborated 
itself according to different strategies in Indigenous dispossession, I assumed that will 
have more or less help in analyzing power (Todd, yes). 
Second, I want to show the limit of western derived critical theory in accounting for 
whatever is existing and might arise in the wake of geontopower as I attempt to show the 
deep governance of western ontologies and metaphysics in liberal settler colonialism. I 
hope readers have intuited that this dual purpose characterizes all my books, although 
perhaps more explicitly as I have gone along. As I elaborate in more detail 
in Geontologies, I became an anthropologist on the request of a generation of older 
Indigenous men and women that I met at Belyuen during a yearlong visit to Australia in 
1984 – by law they had to be represented by an anthropologist if they were to initiate a 
land claim. I was straight out of an undergraduate degree from St. John's College, Santa 
Fe. On graduation students receive a degree in Philosophy, but what one is truly receiving 
is an indoctrination into western ontology, metaphysics, and epistemology. St John's 
College writes the global history as if it were the history of the west's civilization 
unfolding globally. It is not possible to understood the analytics of existence of this 
generation of Indigenous men and women as anything but a forceful alternative to what I 
was taught even as the spirit of the west showed its perversions as it expressed itself in 
anthropology, law, and hegemonic publics. My understanding of their request that I 
become an anthropologist for me was not that I translate them for the law, but that I 
participate with them in understanding and resisting the formation of power claiming to 
want to listen to them – to apprehend them – as that power defined what was legitimate 
for them to say and show. In this regime of late liberal recognition, the translation-
function, or diplomatic function, keeps the problem of national belonging and inclusion 
on one side of the conversation. Those excluded must show themselves in such a way that 
they are different, but not so different as to shatter the skeletal structure of settler law.  
The point of my writings, whether I have been successful or not, was to shift the focus of 
the gaze, of the problematic, of who must answer to whom. It has been to return the 
problem of difference to late liberalism, to make it encounter its own limits. Garnet 
Kindervater writes powerfully, because he knows from his own research that the point is 
to focus on how governance superimposes “a kind of knowledge supposedly justifying 
the supremacy of some over others, and underwriting the attendant institutions delivering 
violence upon whom it defined as colonizeable, enslavable, those beyond salvation, the 
wretched, and the killable.” And it is stating and stating again that “call it object 
formation, or citational power, regardless, the extent to which late liberalism's work of 
substantiating, aggregating, and uniting undertakes first and foremost to ally itself with a 
modern form of accumulation that always, and in the name of scientific exactitude, 
marginalized people as things, landscapes as enclosures, geos as mere use-value.” In my 
early work it was to turn the focus to late liberal modes of recognition and 
multiculturalism. In the latter books I have turned the focus more explicitly on the critical 
philosophies subtending late liberalism.  
Zoe Todd argues powerfully that as in Australia so in the settler state of Canada, “it is not 
enough to merely recognize non-Western or Indigenous ontologies. We must engage with 
the consequences and implications of their erasure and capture.” Have I been successful 
in these efforts? Hopefully partially. Certainly not completely. And for some not at all! I 
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myself have found it difficult to present enough grist of the “here where you are 
apprehending others” sees your limit, but not too much such that (i) something is given 
away that is not mine or the readers right to have and (ii) any reader who is expecting to 
hear about Indigenous difference is left off the hook of confronting themselves. Again, I 
wouldn't say I have ever been completely successful in this goal but these were the goals. 
But Kathryn Yusoff, whose work has been so essential to our understandings the racial 
and settler colonial logics of climate change, notes, the governance of geontopower 
maintains its hold through the “wonder of life (which is a force of narcissism par 
excellence).” And she is right, I think, that geontopower does not work merely from 
excluding certain forms from Life but also from how they are included in their exclusions 
– the idea that there are Stone Age races who operate as social fossils in the way of 
progress is not an old discourse long ago tucked away in a curiosity cabinet, but always 
available for a new enemy of liberal extractions. Witness the Islamaphobic language in 
the US wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.    
As corollaries to this point: (a) I can understand why Keith Woodward might think I am 
hovering above the Dreamings. I can only repeat what I said above about on whom I 
hope to keep the analytic gaze. (b) Johnson is right that I am particularly critical of the 
speculative realists, but the organization of the chapters was meant to leave aside the 
wars of position within critical theory – I choose Foucault, I choose Derrida, et cetera. 
Instead I try to demonstrate the limits of theorists I have been most influenced by: 
Foucault, Deleuze, Charles S. Peirce and William James. This doesn't mean I have 
stopped thinking about possible alliances among Western derived critical theory and 
Indigenous critical theory, knowledge, and practice. I very much remain so intrigued – 
and thus why I will consider Woodward's worries about what he calls “matter-
processing” even as I wonder how I wrote such that I could be read as having 
presupposed a “grid of Truth” composed of “thought and sensation, idea and the world.” 
But I also work on myself and the habits of my thought, stretching far back to Santa Fe 
and beyond, by remembering Aimé Césaire’s caution, that while there is nothing wrong 
with conversation among peoples, colonizers were never actually engaged in a 
conversation with the colonized.  
Third, I want to contribute my energy to keeping open or enlarging cramped space – that, 
following Todd, I'd acknowledge Erica Violet Lee, Karl Mika, Aileen Moreton-
Robertson, Glen Coulthard, Audra Simpson and so many others working toward the same 
and whose works are so essential to us all. Here I see myself standing alongside rather 
than in front of not merely my Karrabing colleagues and their ancestors but my 
colleagues in critical Indigenous studies and decolonizing studies. I begin repeating 
myself at this point, but I take the risk of repetition rather than not – better or worse given 
where I come from no matter how much of my life has been spent with and within my 
Indigenous family, the north and west and the canon, I think my contribution might be to 
help stand against a relentless swallowing (yes, Simpson's understanding of the 
apprehension of Indigenous world). But also increasingly I work alongside Karrabing in 
film and art practices in which a double move – on the one hand, the authorship moves 
definitively to some 30 Indigenous men and women young and old; and on the other the 
goal of this too is what they wish is the redirection of resources – my own and the critical 
curatorial arts and film – from accumulation in the North to accumulation for their 
world.      
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